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Neuronal reward valuations provide the physiological basis for economic behavior. Yet, 
how such valuations relate to economic decisions remains unclear. Here we show that 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex (DLPFC) implements a flexible value code based on 
object-specific valuations by single neurons. As monkeys perform a reward-based 
foraging task, individual DLPFC neurons signal the value of specific choice objects 
derived from recent experience. These neuronal object values satisfy principles of 
competitive choice mechanisms, track performance fluctuations, and follow predictions 
of a classical behavioral model (Herrnstein’s matching law). Individual neurons 
dynamically encode both, the updating of object values from recently experienced 
rewards, and their subsequent conversion to object choices during decision-making. 
Decoding from unselected populations enables a read-out of motivational and decision 
variables not emphasized by individual neurons. These findings suggest a dynamic 
single-neuron and population value code in DLPFC that advances from reward 
experiences to economic object values and future choices. 
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Rewards are essential goals for economic decisions and behavior. In natural environments, 
reward probabilities are often unknown and decision-making requires internal value 
estimation from recent experience
1-5
. Such value estimates constitute critical elements in 
reinforcement learning
6
 and computational decision theories
7-9
. Although neurophysiological 
studies uncovered experience-based value signals in different brain structures
1,3,5
, key 
questions about the neural value code remain unresolved. 
 First, it is unclear how individual neurons encode value estimates as input for decision 
mechanisms. Biologically realistic decision models use separate value inputs for different 
choice objects that compete through winner-take-all mechanisms
6-9
, rather than explicit 
relative (comparative) valuations. Although object-specific valuations seem computationally 
advantageous, relative valuations—which can be derived from object-specific values—are 
frequently observed in human imaging neural population signals
10-15
. Second, although 
neuronal values were typically referenced to actions in previous studies
1,3,5
, decisions are 
often made between objects. This distinction is significant, as objects constitute the 
fundamental choice unit in economic theory. Orbitofrontal cortex (OFC) neurons encode 
economic object valuations when value is explicitly signalled by external cues
16-18
. However, 
it is unclear whether object value neurons also encode recent reward experiences, as implied 
by the concept of value construction
2-4,7
, and whether they directly convert values to choices, 
as predicted by computational models
8,9
. 
Here we recorded the activity of single neurons in the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex 
(DLPFC) of monkeys performing an object-based foraging task. The DLPFC is implicated in 
diverse functions including decision-making
19-28
, behavioral control
29-34
 and reinforcement 
learning
35,36
. Previous neurophysiological studies showed that DLPFC neurons encode 
important economic decision variables including reward probability, reward magnitude, 
effort
19,26
, reward and choice history
20,35,36
. DLPFC is also connected to sensory, motor and 
reward systems
29,37
, including parietal cortex and striatum, where experience-based value 
signals are found
1,3,5
, and anterior cingulate cortex, where lesions impair performance based 
on reward experience
38
. 
We hypothesized that individual DLPFC neurons encode the construction of values 
from experience, their formatting into object-specific decision variables, and their conversion 
to object choices. We tested whether DLPFC neurons encode values of specific choice 
objects termed ‘object values’, in analogy to action values6 and in line with competitive 
choice mechanisms
6,39,40
. Although a negative finding would not necessarily contradict the 
role of DLPFC in decision-making, a positive result would lend credence to the neuronal 
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implementation of competitive decision models, similar to previous single-neuron 
representations of complex decision variables
41
. We elicited valuations in a foraging task that 
required internal value construction from reward history and encouraged proportional 
allocation of choices to rewards received from different objects, following Herrnstein’s 
matching law
42
. The task temporally separated valuation from choice and action, allowing us 
to identify separate neuronal signals for these distinct computational steps. In addition to 
single-neuron analysis, we used linear decoding to read out values and value-derived decision 
variables from DLPFC population activity without pre-selecting neurons for value coding. 
We show that individual DLPFC neurons dynamically encode the value of specific 
choice objects as a decision variable. Individual neurons signal both the construction of 
object values from recently experienced rewards and their subsequent conversion to object 
choices. Population decoding demonstrates a dynamic readout of additional value-derived 
variables not encoded by individual neuron, which meet the motivational and decision 
requirements of different task stages. This dynamic object value code— characterized by 
single-neuron convergence of valuation, learning, and decision signals and flexible 
population readout—may support DLPFC’s signature role in adaptive behavior. 
  
RESULTS 
Object-based foraging task 
Two monkeys performed in a foraging choice task in which the probability of 
receiving a reward from each of two options varied dynamically and in an unsignaled manner 
across trials. In each testing session, two visual objects (A and B) served as choice targets 
(Fig. 1a). The animal made a saccade to its object of choice and received either a drop of 
liquid reward or no reward depending on the object’s reinforcement schedule. Left-right 
object positions varied randomly trial-by-trial. During blocks of typically 50 to 150 trials, 
each object was associated with a base reward probability according to which a reward was 
assigned on every trial. Rewards remained available until the animal chose the object. Thus, 
the instantaneous reward probability for a particular object increased with the number of 
trials the object was not chosen; it fell back to base probability after each choice of the object. 
Under such conditions, an effective strategy is to repeatedly choose the object with the higher 
base probability and only choose the alternative when its instantaneous reward probability 
has exceeded the base probability of the currently sampled object
2,43
. Global behavior in such 
tasks usually conforms to the matching law
42
, which states that the ratio of choices to two 
alternatives matches the ratio of the number of rewards received from each alternative
2-5
. 
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Thus, to maximize reward income, the animals had to track changes in block-wise 
reward probabilities and local fluctuations owing to the matching task design. This required 
keeping track of the history of recent rewards and object choices. As reward probabilities 
within blocks varied predictably in a trial- and choice-dependent manner, the animals could 
internally evaluate and choose between objects before cue appearance on each trial. This task 
design, in combination with randomized trial-by-trial cue positions, allowed us to test for 
neuronal encoding of object values and choices before action selection. 
 
Matching behavior and object value model 
Across sessions, both animals conformed to the matching law by allocating their 
object choices according to the number of rewards available from each object (Fig. 1b). In a 
representative session, the animal continuously matched its local choice ratio to the current 
reward ratio (i.e. the number of received rewards), and readily adapted to block-wise changes 
in base probabilities (Fig. 1c). Thus, the animals behaved meaningfully, according to 
predictions from Herrnstein’s matching law, which validated the foraging task as a model for 
neuronal object valuation and decision processes. 
Base reward probabilities and instantaneous probabilities were not externally cued but 
required learning and continual updating. Thus, internally constructed, subjective value 
estimates likely guided the animals’ choices. To examine neuronal value coding, we 
estimated these internal values using established approaches
2,4
. Logistic regression 
determined how the history of past rewards on each object influenced current choices. As 
matching also required occasional switching between objects, we incorporated a term for 
choice history
4
. Subjective values for specific choice objects estimated in this manner likely 
constituted the main decision variable for the animals, which we call ‘object value’. 
We derived value estimates by convolving object-specific reward and choice histories 
with filters, obtained from logistic regression, that assigned higher weight to more recent 
rewards and choices
2-4
. We summed weighted reward and choice histories for each object to 
obtain scalar, single-trial measures of object value. Filter weights were derived by fitting a 
logistic regression based on reward and choice history to the animals’ choices. The resulting 
filter shapes (Fig. 1d) resemble those found in previous studies
2-4
, with declining absolute 
weights as a function of past trials. 
Choices in a representative session were well described by the value model: model-
derived choice probability closely tracked local and block-wise fluctuations in the animal’s 
behavior and value estimates followed block-wise and local reward income fluctuations (Fig. 
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1e). For model validation, we performed an out-of-sample prediction with filter weights 
derived from separate data. This confirmed that object values predicted trial-by-trial choices 
(Fig. 1f) and that object value difference fitted the animals’ choice probabilities (Fig. 1g). 
While the value difference between objects likely directed choices, the sum of object 
values may have been an important motivational influence irrespective of choice direction. 
Such ‘net value’ effects are critical in goal-directed behavior and have previously been shown 
to influence performance
44. We tested whether value sum was related to the animals’ 
motivation, measured by trial initiation times (key touch latency). Multiple regression 
confirmed value sum as main determinant of trial initiation time: the animals’ initiated trials 
faster when value sum was high, (Fig. 1h,i) consistent with a motivational effect due to 
overall reward expectation. By contrast, saccadic reaction times during choice were 
influenced by the absolute (unsigned) value difference (Supplementary Fig. 1), consistent 
with previous studies and theoretical models that relate absolute value difference to decision 
difficulty and confidence
28,45,46
. 
Taken together, the animals’ choices were well described by object value estimates 
that were internally constructed and continually updated from reward and choice histories. 
While value difference was suited to direct choices towards specific objects, value sum 
reflected the animals’ overall motivation. 
 
Encoding of object value in single DLPFC neurons 
We conceptualize object value analogous to action value
6
 as a decision variable that 
signals the value of specific choice alternatives as suitable input to competitive choice 
mechanisms. A neuronal response encoding object value should (i) signal value in time to 
inform the animal’s choice, (ii) signal the value of one choice object but not of alternative 
objects, and (iii) signal value on each trial, irrespective of whether the object is chosen or not. 
Multiple linear regression analysis determined whether neuronal responses encoded object 
values according to these criteria while factoring out other task-related variables and testing 
for alternative (relative) decision variables. Our main conclusions are based on statistical tests 
within this regression framework; in addition, we plot activity time-courses and single linear 
regressions to illustrate effects. 
The activity of the DLPFC neuron in Fig. 2 fulfilled our criteria for object value 
coding, as determined by multiple regression analysis. Before appearance of the choice cues, 
a phasic response leading up to the cue period reflected the current value of object A, with 
higher activity signalling lower value (Fig. 2a). True to the object value definition, pre-cue 
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activity reflected the value of object A but not of object B (Fig. 2b); no trial period showed a 
significant relationship to object B value. Activity was better explained by object value than 
by object choice (Fig. 2c, d, non-significant choice coefficient). Our experimental design 
precluded relationships to object position or left-right action in pre-cue periods, as confirmed 
by non-significant regression coefficients (Fig. 2d). As a further test of object-specificity, we 
adopted a classification approach based on the angle of regression coefficients in value space 
(see Methods)
44
. This resulted in a classification scheme of responses into absolute (object) 
value or relative (sum/difference) value coding depending on the polar angle (θ) of 
coefficients in value space (colored areas). This approach confirmed that the neuronal 
response coded the absolute value of object A (Fig. 2e). Thus, the neuron’s pre-cue activity 
signalled the value of a specific choice object, irrespective of whether the object was chosen. 
Among 205 DLPFC neurons with 1222 task-related responses in different task 
periods (P < 0.005, Wilcoxon test) 119 neurons (58%) had value-related activity as indexed 
by a significant value regression coefficient (P < 0.05, multiple regression, Supplementary 
Table 1). Analysis of different fixed time windows throughout the trial showed that value 
activity occurred in all task-phases, including pre-cue periods before the animals indicated 
their choice (Fig. 3a,b). Crucially, visual stimulation and eye position in pre-cue periods 
were restricted by constant fixation requirement; therefore, these activities did not reflect 
external sensory information but an internal valuation process. Fixation was also required 
following the animal’s saccade choice until the reward period. In addition, cue position and 
saccade choice direction were included as covariates in all regression analyses. Sliding 
window regressions confirmed a substantial number of DLPFC neurons with value-related 
activity (Supplementary Fig. 2, Supplementary Table 2) and showed that many value 
signals occurred early in trials around fixation spot onset. Thus, value signals in the DLPFC 
neuronal population occurred in time to influence object-based decision processes. 
Additional tests substantiated the statistical significance of value coding: the observed 
distribution of value coefficients was significantly different from a distribution based on 
randomly shuffled data, and shifted towards lower negative and higher positive values 
(Supplementary Fig. 3). The proportion of significant value coefficients was higher than 
expected by chance (P < 0.0001 binomial test); false positive rate in shuffled data was lower 
than five per cent. Of 273 significant value coefficients (239 individual responses), 131 had a 
positive sign, implying higher activity with higher value, and 142 had a negative sign (P = 
0.273, binomial test, Supplementary Fig. 3). Equal numbers of neurons and responses were 
found related to object A value and object B value (136/137 responses significant for object 
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A/B, 81 neurons significant for both objects). The neurons were recorded from the upper and 
lower banks of the principal sulcus, confirmed by histology (Fig. 3c, Supplementary Fig. 4). 
Thus, a substantial number of DLPFC neurons showed value-related responses. We next 
show that many of these responses satisfied our criteria for object value coding. 
 
Object specificity and choice independence of value signals 
An object value response should reflect the value of one specific object without 
reflecting the value of other objects. True to this criterion, the majority of value-related 
activities (205/239, 85.8%) were object-specific without coding value for the other object, as 
assessed by population activity and significance of value coefficients (Fig. 3d, 
Supplementary Fig. 3, Supplementary Table 3). Significantly fewer activities coded value 
for both objects (34/239, 14.2%, P < 0.001, z-test), which indicated that relative value 
coding—that is, a relationship to the value sum or difference—occurred in a minority of 
neurons. An alternative test of object-specificity used a classification approach based on the 
angle of regression coefficients in value space
44
. Fitting a simpler model that contained only 
regressors for object A value and object B value (Eq. 4) resulted in 168 responses with 
significant overall model fit (P < 0.05, F-test; Fig. 3e). Classification into object value and 
relative value was based on the polar angle (θ) of coefficients in value space. The 
classification was invariant to the axis choice of value coefficients (see Methods). This axis-
invariant method has been suggested to provide a fairer classification into absolute and 
relative value signals, and can yield different results compared to conventional regressions
44
. 
However, in our dataset of DLPFC neurons, this alternative analysis confirmed our original 
result: value-related responses were predominantly object-specific; 124 responses were 
classified as coding object value (74%); 44 responses as coding relative value (P < 0.001, z-
test). Among relative value-coding responses, 35 responses coded value sum (21%) and 9 
responses coded value difference (5%). Thus, different analysis approaches confirmed object-
specificity of value coding in DLPFC neurons (Fig. 3 e,f). 
True to the concept of a decision variable, object value signals should occur on trials 
when the object is chosen and on trials when the object is not chosen. The majority of value-
related responses satisfied this criterion by not showing a significant choice coefficient 
(206/239, 86%, Supplementary Table 3). Distributions of value and choice coefficients in 
value-coding responses differed significantly, with minor overlap (Fig. 3g). Although both 
value and choice coding occurred in pre-cue periods, the proportion of pre-cue value 
responses was significantly higher than that of choice responses (P = 10
-7
, z-test). Thus, value 
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coding preceded choice coding in our task. Our regression model could often not be 
improved by adding value × choice interaction terms (P < 0.05, partial F-test): many value-
related responses (158 of 1222 task-related responses, 13%) had non-significant value × 
choice interaction coefficients (compared to 206 choice-independent value responses in our 
main regression, 17%). Object value responses were also not explained by chosen value 
coding (Supplementary Fig. 5, Supplementary Table 4).  
Randomized cue positions precluded coding of left-right cue position or action before 
the cue period as confirmed by less than five per cent significant coefficients. Following cue 
onset, a large proportion of DLPFC neurons encoded spatial cue position and left-right action 
(Supplementary Table 1, Supplementary Fig. 2), reproducing known effects in 
DLPFC
34,47
. Some of these post-cue responses coded spatial cue position and action jointly 
with value (Supplementary Table 3). Thus, in addition to pure object value coding, some 
hybrid responses coded value in conjunction with other task-relevant variables. 
Overall, 98 of 611 task-related pre-cue responses (16%) met our strictest criteria for 
object value coding: value coding for one specific object with insignificant coefficients for 
the alternative object and insignificant choice coefficient. Taken together, these results show 
that a substantial proportion of DLPFC neurons coded object value in time to inform the 
animal’s choice and in compliance with formal criteria for a decision variable. 
 
Action value control 
Optimal behavior in the foraging task required tracking the value of visual objects 
rather than of left-right actions. Nevertheless, we also examined whether DLPFC responses 
reflected action value, as found previously
22,23
. We recalculated our behavioral model by 
fitting a logistic regression to the animals’ left-right choices, based on action and action-
reward history
4,5
. Despite providing an inferior fit compared to the object value model, the 
action value model showed significant filter weights for recent action and action-reward 
history, typically extending up to two trials into the past. We used the resulting action values 
as regressors for neuronal activity in supplementary analyses.  
Including action values alongside object values in the same model resulted in 165 
responses (of 1222 task-related responses, 13%) related to object value but not action value, 
and 97 responses (8%) related to action value but not object value. The total number of 
responses related to object value was significantly higher than that for action values (257 vs. 
192, P < 0.01, z-test). In a stepwise regression, 171 responses were uniquely explained by 
object value compared to 126 responses uniquely explained by action value (P = 0.0053, χ2-
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test). Thus, object value was the more important variable in direct comparisons, even when it 
competed with action value in the same regression model. 
 
Behavioral relevance of neuronal object values 
If neuronal object values in DLPFC provided a basis for local choices and global 
matching behavior, they should be related to the animals’ behavior. We tested this prediction 
as follows. 
First, to test behavioral relevance at the level of local choice probabilities, we 
compared the average activity of object value responses for a given value level with the 
corresponding local behavioral choice probability. As the value of a given object increased, 
the probability of choosing that object also increased, consistent with our behavioral model 
(Fig. 4a). Average object value activity for given value levels closely followed local choice 
probabilities, with opposing trends for value responses related to different objects (left panel). 
These local choice probabilities were in turn suitable to generate global matching behavior, as 
their aggregate over a given session reflected the animals’ experienced reward ratio in that 
session (right panel). Thus, neuronal object values, observed at a local timescale of individual 
trials, provided a suitable basis for global matching behavior. 
Second, we tested whether the strength of neuronal object value coding was related to 
the animals’ matching performance. We measured the animal’s ‘valuation accuracy’ as the 
session-specific correlation between object values and the true, trial-by-trial object reward 
probabilities given by the base probabilities and reinforcement schedule. We then regressed 
this behavioral valuation accuracy on the neuronal value coding strength (the session-specific 
slope of the relationship between neuronal activity and value). The strength of neuronal value 
coding explained variation in valuation accuracy: stronger neuronal value coding was 
associated with more accurate reward probability estimates (Fig. 4b). In turn, more accurate 
probability estimates led to a higher proportion of optimal choices, i.e. choosing the option 
with higher momentary reward probability (R = 0.197, P = 0.0011, linear regression, N = 205 
sessions from both animals). Thus, stronger neuronal value coding correlated with accurate 
valuation and better performance. 
 Finally, if neuronal object values are behaviorally relevant, they should fluctuate with 
local, trial-by-trial performance, including errors. In a population analysis, we identified trials 
on which the animal committed an error (e.g. failed to release the touch key or broke fixation) 
and regressed neuronal activity on object value across value-coding neurons. Immediately 
before error trials, population activity was significantly related to object value (Fig. 4c,d, 
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‘Pre-error). The strength of this relationship dropped on subsequent trials when the animals 
would commit an error (‘Error’), and reappeared on the trial following the error (‘Post-
error’). By contrast, raw impulse rates were not significantly different between error and non-
error trials (all P > 0.1, Wilcoxon test). Thus, neuronal object value coding transiently 
declined on error trials, suggesting a relationship with performance fluctuations. 
  
Single-neuron conversion from experience to object value 
Our behavioral analysis showed that the animals’ choices were based on object values 
that were internally constructed from recent reward history and choice history, which 
constitute precursors for object values. Consistent with previous findings in DLPFC 
neurons
20,23,35
, direct regression of activity on these history terms showed significant numbers 
of responses related to last object choice (87/1222, 7%), last action (78/1222, 6%), last 
outcome (111/1222, 9%) and last object choice × last outcome (78/1222, 6%, 
Supplementary Fig. 6). The percentage of responses related to the interaction between last 
action and last outcome (a control variable in our study) did not exceed chance level. 
Supplementary regression with value and history terms as covariates (Supplementary Table 
5) showed that history variables did not account for object value responses (292 significant 
value coefficients compared to 273 in our main model; 105 value responses (36%) showed 
non-significant history terms). However, the coding of reward and choice history alongside 
object value could suggest that individual DLPFC neurons reflect the trial-by-trial 
construction and updating of object value from recent experience. Such value construction is 
predicted by our behavioral model, which constructs value from weighted reward and choice 
history. 
A significant number of DLPFC neurons showed dynamic coding transitions 
consistent with the hypothesized value construction. Across DLPFC neurons, a substantial 
number were sensitive to both value and last-trial information (113/205, 55%, sliding 
regression). Early in trials, these neurons encoded past rewards and past choices before 
encoding a scalar, current-trial value signal (Fig. 5a, Supplementary Fig. 6). We identified 
77 neurons (37%) that encoded both last-trial information and value in pre-cue periods. 
Among them, 47 neurons (61%; 23% of all recorded neurons) encoded last-trial information 
before encoding current-trial value. The occurrence of such neurons was significantly higher 
than expected by chance (P = 1.8 × 10
-7
, binomial test). 
 If neuronal object values are updated based on last-trial information, individual 
neurons should have matching selectivity for last-trial information and current-trial value. 
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That is, a neuron encoding current-trial value for one specific object should encode whether 
that object was chosen on the last trial. We confirmed this prediction by relating the (signed) 
coefficients for last-trial object choice to those for current-trial value: coefficients for the last-
trial choice of object A correlated positively with current-trial value coefficients for object A 
(R = 0.938, P = 2.7 × 10
-23
, linear correlation, Fig. 5b) and negatively with coefficients for 
object B (R = ˗0.969, P = 5.1 × 10-39). Such matched neuronal selectivity seems consistent 
with updating object values from last-trial experience.  
 These results indicate that DLPFC neurons frequently encoded transitions from last-
trial information to current-trial object value. Thus, activity in individual DLPFC neurons 
appeared to reflect the construction and updating of object values. 
 
Single-neuron conversion from object value to object choice 
We showed above that a significant number of neurons had responses in specific task 
epochs that signalled formal object value, without signalling object choice. Across task 
epochs, however, many neurons exhibited dynamic value-to-choice transitions in the sense 
that object choice signals followed earlier value signals. The existence of such coding 
transitions in DLPFC neurons matches the presumed flow of information during decision-
making
8,9
. 
The neuron in Fig. 5c exhibited a value-to-choice conversion: value coding in the 
fixation period preceded later choice coding in the pre-cue period. This conversion is 
consistent with a process that transforms an object value input to an object choice output 
during decision-making. As the neuron’s activity did not subsequently reflect cue position or 
action, it could not by itself instruct action selection but resembled an abstract, action-
independent decision process. Other neurons showed dynamic coding transitions that directly 
converted value to action (Supplementary Fig. 7). We also found neurons exhibiting 
conversions from object choice to cue position and action (Supplementary Fig. 7), similar to 
recently reported DLPFC neurons
21
. Critically, although cue position and action signals were 
related to externally observable events, object value and object choice signals reflected an 
internal decision process.  
Among 95 neurons with pre-choice value coding, the majority (77 neurons, 81%) 
subsequently coded additional variables. Specifically, substantial numbers of neurons 
converted object value to object choice (58/124 responses, 46%, fixed window-analysis), left-
right action (74/124 responses, 60%), or spatial object position (38/124 responses, 31%), with 
some neurons coding more than one additional variable. By contrast, fewer value neurons 
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(19%, P < 10
-13
, binomial test) either coded no additional variable or coded additional 
variables prior to value. Given the percentages of significant value and choice coefficients in 
pre-choice periods, value-to-choice transitions occurred significantly more frequently than 
chance (P < 10
-11
, binomial test). Across neurons with value or choice coding, value signals 
appeared significantly earlier compared to choice coding (Fig. 5d, P < 0.005, Wilcoxon rank-
sum test). 
In summary, the critical parameters for decision-making in the foraging task—reward 
and choice history, object value, and object choice—were dynamically encoded in DLPFC, 
often converging in single neurons (Fig. 5e,f). A large fraction of DLPFC neurons encoded 
object value and value precursor variables without encoding choice (90/205, 44%), consistent 
with the formal object value concept. However, a significant proportion of neurons (29/205, 
14%) also combined all three variables. These coding transitions appear consistent with the 
presumed information flow of value construction, object valuation, and decision-making. 
 
Decoding object value from DLPFC population activity 
Individual DLPFC neurons likely operate in a population, and their collective value 
signals could potentially be read out by different downstream neurons for different functions. 
We used a decoding approach to explore the information about value contained in patterns of 
population activity that were not pre-selected for task-relatedness or value coding (see 
Methods). We aggregated trial-specific impulse rates across neurons and used linear support 
vector machines (SVM) and nearest-neighbour (NN) classifiers to decode object values and 
related decision variables. In our main results, we focus on the SVM as it typically performed 
more accurately. For validation, we found that linear SVMs could decode the basic task 
variables object choice, cue position and action. For example, action (saccade direction) 
could be decoded from post-cue activity with near-perfect accuracy (98.90 ± 0.17 %, P < 1.2 
× 10
-91
, rank-sum test comparison to randomly shuffled data). Time courses of decoding 
accuracy closely matched those from single-neuron regressions (Fig. 6a; Supplementary 
Figs. 2,8 ; R = 0.96, P < 3.4 × 10
-20
, correlation across task periods of decoding accuracy 
with percentages of significant single-neuron regression coefficients). Notably, the choice for 
a specific object could be decoded with modest but above-chance accuracy in pre-cue periods 
(53.27 ± 0.98 %, P < 3.6 × 10
-11
, rank-sum test), whereas cue position and action decoding 
were non-significant before cue onset, confirming the single-neuron findings. These results 
provided a useful validation of our population decoding approach. 
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We tested whether the value of specific objects could be decoded also from 
population activity (all recorded DLPFC neurons, without pre-selection for task-relatedness o 
value coding), as suggested by the presence of individual object value-coding neurons. Even 
without pre-selecting neurons, we decoded object value with good accuracy from the whole 
population (Fig. 6a; Supplementary Fig. 8). As in single neurons, unselected population 
activity encoded object value in all task periods, most strongly in the pre-cue period (79.1 ± 
0.35 %, P < 6.4 × 10
-83
, rank-sum test). As the pre-cue period was a likely time point of 
decision-making, we explored how population decoding in this period depended on various 
parameters. 
We quantified value decoding capacity in relation to population size. Decoding 
performance for object value increased systematically with the number of neurons entered 
into the decoder (Fig. 6b, Supplementary Fig. 8): while decoding for single neurons was 
close to chance, accuracy increased approximately linearly over the first 100 neurons as more 
neurons were added up to a maximum. Such steady increase suggested a distributed 
representation with different neurons carrying partly independent information about value.  
We next analysed how coding in an unselected population depended on the value 
sensitivity of individual neurons. We found a linear relationship between single-neuron value 
regression slopes and single-neuron decoding accuracy (Fig. 6c): neurons that maximized 
value differences (higher value slope) enabled better decoding. Indeed, small subsets of 
individually significant value neurons provided as good a decoding of object value as the 
whole population (Fig. 6d) and decoding accuracy was significantly related to single-neuron 
value sensitivity (Fig. 6e; P < 1.0 × 10
-16
, partial correlation controlling for number of 
significant neurons, mean activity range, slope variance). Thus, neurons with high value 
sensitivity contributed the most to population decoding, with smaller contributions by non-
significant neurons. 
These results suggested accurate object value decoding from the DLPFC population. 
Although decoding generally increased with higher neuron numbers, individually significant 
value neurons contributed most strongly. 
 
Population decoding of value-derived decision variables 
In addition to object value, we could decode from the unselected population other 
value variables not represented in single neuron responses, including value sum and signed 
and unsigned value difference (Fig. 7a). Value sum is an important motivational variable 
related to performance vigour
44
 and predicted trial initiation times (Fig. 1h, i). By contrast, 
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signed value difference is the critical quantity for value comparison in decision models (Fig. 
1f,g)
6-9
, and unsigned value difference relates to decision difficulty (Supplementary Fig. 1) 
and decision confidence
28,45,46
. Average decoding accuracy for value sum and unsigned value 
difference was most pronounced in early task periods and, compared to object value, was 
lower and less consistent in later task periods (Fig. 7a). Thus, the unselected neuronal 
population encoded variables that combined values of different objects, including value sum, 
signed and unsigned value difference. 
Among the different task epochs, the fixation period showed significantly higher 
decoding accuracy for summed rather than individual object value (Fig. 7b, red). In this early 
period, value sum decoding reflected single-neuron value sensitivities for both objects A and 
B (Fig. 7c, lower panels), and more neurons in the decoder increased accuracy significantly 
more for value sum compared to object value (Fig. 7d, Supplementary Fig. 8c). By contrast, 
the subsequent pre-cue period showed significantly better population decoding for individual 
rather than summed object value (Fig. 7b, blue). Here, object value decoding for one specific 
object reflected single-neuron sensitivities only for that particular object (Fig. 7c, upper 
panels), which was also evident with the benefit derived from more neurons in the decoder 
(Fig. 7d). Thus, the key decision variables of object value and value sum were best encoded 
in particular task periods, which matched the different behavioral functions of value sum 
(initial motivation, Fig. 1h,i) and object value (subsequent decision-making, Fig. 1f,g). 
These findings suggested different levels of value coding in the DLPFC that evolved 
over trial periods and matched the behavioral requirements in different tasks stages. Single 
DLPFC neurons encoded object value (Fig. 8a). By contrast, activity in an unselected 
population encoded additional specific and well conceptualized decision variables not 
represented in single neurons that may make important contributions to distinct behavioral 
functions (Fig. 8b).  
 
DISCUSSION 
We found that individual DLPFC neurons encoded internal value estimates derived 
from the fluctuating reward probabilities of specific choice objects. These value signals 
fulfilled criteria for a decision variable: they were object-specific, distinct from sensory and 
motor responses, timed to inform decision-making, and independent of current-trial choice. 
Further, they tracked behavioral performance and followed Herrnstein’s matching law and 
were thus suited to guide the animals’ behavior. Individual DLPFC neurons encoded both the 
construction of object values from recent reward experience and their subsequent conversion 
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to choice signals. Thus, signals related to these computationally distinct processes converged 
onto single DLPFC neurons. Object value signals also enabled flexible population readout of 
decision variables not emphasized by single neurons. Together, our findings suggest that 
DLPFC realizes a dynamic single-neuron and population value code that reflects the 
translation of recent reward experiences into economic object values and future choices. 
Individual DLPFC neurons mostly encoded value for specific choice objects, rather 
than relative valuations. We do not argue that explicit object value signals are strictly 
required for neural decision-making, which likely emerges as a population phenomenon. 
However, object-specific value coding by single neurons is advantageous computationally 
because it ensures that value is updated for one specific object but not for others—the key 
issue of credit assignment in reinforcement learning
6
. It also enables single-neuron 
conversion from object value to object choice, which ensures unambiguous identification of 
chosen objects. We found that single DLPFC neurons realized these computational 
advantages by encoding conversions from experienced rewards to object values and 
subsequent choices. We suggest that explicit object value signals, rather than relative 
valuations, would also be observed in situations involving more than two choice objects, 
although this prediction remains to be tested in future studies. 
In addition to explicit single-neuron representations, distributed population codes 
confer greater flexibility to a neural system for they allow high-accuracy, flexible readout of 
multiple task variables
48-50
. Consistent with this notion, the population of DLPFC neurons 
allowed precise decoding of object values (Fig. 8a). The approximately linear increase in 
decoding accuracy as more neurons were added suggests that neurons carried partly 
independent value information. Indeed, value sensitivity varied considerably across neurons 
and population decoding depended on individual neurons’ value sensitivities. Such neuronal 
tuning variation may be advantageous for information processing in associative networks as it 
can increase storage capacity
50
. 
Population decoding enabled readout of functionally important variables not 
emphasized by single neurons. For example, the sum of object values represents a 
motivational variable suited to calibrate performance vigor
44
 and accordingly correlated 
inversely with the animals’ trial initiation times. Consistently, population activity encoded 
value sum most strongly at trial start. Such a value sum signal arises naturally in biologically 
realistic decision systems with attractor dynamics, which converge to a choice state faster 
when value sum is high
7,10
. Flexible population readout of different value variables could be 
achieved by selective wiring from object-specific value neurons onto different downstream 
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neurons or by dynamically adjustable synaptic connections (Fig. 8b). For example, DLPFC 
object value subpopulations could provide common inputs to parts of the striatum containing 
value sum-coding neurons
44
. The additionally observed (although less accurate) population 
coding of unsigned value difference is predicted by computational decision models
46
, and 
considered a key quantity related to decision confidence28,45,46. (We did not include a 
behavioral confidence test in our task but unsigned value difference correlated with reaction 
times). Notably, value difference signals are frequently observed in human neuroimaging 
population signals, which average across large numbers of neurons
10-15
. Although such 
techniques successfully localize decision signals across distributed brain systems
10-15
, our 
results suggest that they may not necessarily accurately identify the information encoded by 
single neurons in a given cortical area. 
Two previous studies provided critical evidence that the primate brain computes 
internal values during matching behavior
3,5
. Our findings build on this earlier work and offer 
new insights into the neural basis of value construction. First, value signals during matching 
in parietal area LIP and striatum are spatially referenced and time-locked to sensory targets or 
movement onset
3,5
. By contrast, the DLPFC neurons reported here signalled the value of 
choice objects, rather than actions, irrespective of and prior to action information. Such 
object-based valuations confer greater flexibility by enabling arbitrary mappings from chosen 
objects to required actions and by allowing object choices before action information is 
available. We suggest, following Sugrue and colleagues
3
, that abstract, action-independent 
valuations as uncovered here in DLPFC neurons are computed upstream of LIP and 
subsequently remapped onto space and action. Our finding that DLPFC neurons convert 
object values to choices, spatial representations and actions indicate that DLPFC participates 
in this remapping alongside LIP, although conclusive evidence will require simultaneous 
recordings from both areas in the same monkeys, performing the same task. Second, in 
contrast to LIP and striatal neurons, many DLPFC neurons encoded value precursor 
variables, such as reward and choice history, before encoding value. This could suggest that 
DLPFC participates actively in the current-trial computation of values from recent 
reinforcement history. Third, different from striatal action value neurons
5
, the presently 
described DLPFC object value neurons encoded explicit conversions from value to choice. 
This could suggest a role for DLPFC in the decision process. This interpretation is supported 
by a recent study
23
 showing stronger and earlier action coding in DLPFC compared to 
striatum, although value-to-choice transitions as shown here were not demonstrated. While 
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the basal ganglia may be important for storing values long-term
1,5,51
, DLPFC neurons seem 
important for their construction and conversion to choice on single trials. 
The present value-to-choice conversions in single DLPFC neurons are consistent with 
biologically plausible attractor theories of how decisions arise in neural networks
8,9
. 
However, the present results cannot determine whether these coding transitions originate in 
DLPFC or reflect processing in another brain area. This determination will likely require 
simultaneous recordings from multiple brain systems. Thus, although our experiments cannot 
directly show that choice computations are performed in DLPFC, our results support the 
hypothesis
14,24,25
 that DLPFC is important for neuronal decision processes. 
DLPFC object value neurons resemble offer value neurons in OFC observed during 
economic choice
16-18
 as both types of neuron encode object-specific values irrespective of 
choice and action. However, whereas separate OFC neurons encode values and choices
17
, 
many DLPFC neurons reported here exhibited dynamic value-to-choice conversions. Further, 
transitions from reward experience to value as reported here in DLPFC have not been found 
in OFC. This could suggest that OFC and DLPFC make different contributions to decision-
making, or that decision processes differ between choice tasks with explicit value cues and 
those requiring internal, history-based value construction. The latter interpretation is 
supported by a recent study with explicitly cued flavoured juice rewards
21
 in which DLPFC 
neurons showed choice-to-action conversions while apparently only few DLPFC neurons 
encoded offer values. Our DLPFC object-value signals contrast markedly with explicit 
relative value (value difference) signals reported in ventromedial prefrontal cortex
52
, 
striatum
44,53,54
, and anterior cingulate cortex
55
, which could reflect processing differences 
between DLPFC and these other regions. Although differences in data modelling can 
contribute to different findings between studies, we confirmed that our results were robust to 
analysis variations with several regression approaches and population decoding. DLPFC 
object value neurons also differ from explicit reward prediction by conditioned stimuli
39,51,56-
58
, as their activity was object-specific, not linked to sensory-motor responses, measured 
during free choice, and independent of current-trial choice. These features distinguish a 
genuine decision variable
40
 from known reward prediction and reward-modulated sensory-
motor activity in DLPFC
59,60
. Finally, although we replicated previously shown DLPFC 
chosen value signals
21
, these were separate from and could not account for object value 
coding. 
In conclusion, our data show that single DLPFC neurons encode reward valuations for 
specific choice objects based on recent experience. Object value signals complied with 
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criteria for a decision variable, tracked the animals’ performance, and followed Herrnstein’s 
classical matching law. Individual DLPFC neurons dynamically encoded conversions from 
reward and choice history to object value, and from object value to object choice. Thus, 
DLPFC object value neurons seem well suited to support learning and decision-making in 
situations requiring internal, experience-based value construction. DLPFC population activity 
encoded additional value variables not emphasized by single neurons, which could inform 
motivational and decision processes at different task stages. Together, our data suggest that 
DLPFC implements a dynamic and computationally flexible object value code, consistent 
with its signature role in adaptive behavior. 
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METHODS 
Animals 
All animal procedures conformed to US National Institutes of Health Guidelines and were 
approved by the Home Office of the United Kingdom. Two adult male macaque monkeys 
(Macaca mulatta) weighing 5.5 – 6.5 kg served for the experiments. The number of animals 
used is typical for primate neurophysiology experiments. The animals had no history of 
participation in previous experiments. A head holder and recording chamber were fixed to the 
skull under general anaesthesia and aseptic conditions. Standard electrophysiological 
techniques permitted extracellular recordings from single neurons in the sulcus principalis 
area of the frontal cortex via stereotaxically oriented vertical tracks, as confirmed by 
histological reconstruction. After completion of data collection, recording sites were marked 
with small electrolytic lesions (15–20 µA, 20–60 s). The animals received an overdose of 
pentobarbital sodium (90 mg/kg iv) and were perfused with 4% paraformaldehyde in 0.1 M 
phosphate buffer through the left ventricle of the heart. Recording positions were 
reconstructed from 50-µm-thick, stereotaxically oriented coronal brain sections stained with 
cresyl violet. 
 
Behavioral Task 
Each monkey was trained in an oculomotor free-choice task. In every trial, the subject chose 
one of two objects to which reward was independently and stochastically assigned. Two 
different abstract pictures served as choice objects (square, 5º visual angle). Each trial started 
with presentation of a red fixation spot (diameter: 0.6º) in the center of a computer monitor in 
front of the animal (viewing distance: 41 cm) (Figure 1A). The animal fixated the spot and 
contacted a touch sensitive, immobile resting key at elbow height. An infrared eye tracking 
system continuously monitored eye positions (ISCAN, Cambridge, MA). During the fixation 
period at 1.0-2.0 s after eye fixation and key touch, an alert cue covering the fixation spot 
appeared for 0.7-1.0 s. At 1.4-2.0 s following offset of the alert stimulus, two different visual 
fractal objects (A, B) appeared simultaneously as ocular choice targets on each side of the 
fixation spot at 10º lateral to the center of the monitor. Left and right positions of objects A 
and B alternated pseudorandomly across trials. The animal made a saccadic eye movement to 
the target of its choice within a time window of 0.25-0.75 s. A red peripheral fixation spot 
replaced the target after 1.0-2.0 s of target fixation. This fixation spot turned to green after 
0.5-1.0 s, and the monkey released the touch key immediately after color change. Rewarded 
trials ended with a fixed quantity of 0.7 ml juice delivered immediately upon key release. A 
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computer-controlled solenoid valve delivered juice reward from a spout in front of the 
animal's mouth. Unrewarded trials ended at key release and without further stimuli. The 
fixation requirements restricted the animals’ eye movements in our main periods from trial 
start to cue appearance and, following the animals’ saccade choice, from choice acquisition to 
reward delivery. This ensured that neuronal activity was minimally influenced by oculomotor 
activity, especially in our main periods of interest before cue appearance.  
 According to the basic rule of the matching task, the reward probabilities of object A 
and B were independently calculated in every trial, depending on the numbers of consecutive 
unchosen trials (Eq. 1): 
 
𝑃 = 1 − (1 − 𝑃0)
𝑛+1 
 
with P as instantaneous reward probability, P0 as experimentally imposed, base probability 
setting, and n as the number of trials that the object had been consecutively unchosen. This 
equation implies that reward was probabilistically assigned to the object in every trial, and 
once a reward was assigned, it remained available until the associated object was chosen. 
Therefore the likelihood of being rewarded on a target increased as the number of trials 
performed after the object was last chosen. On the other hand, it stayed at the base probability 
while the object was repeatedly chosen. The reward probability fell back to the base 
probability with every choice of that object, irrespective of whether that choice was rewarded 
or not. 
 We varied the base reward probability in blocks of typically 50-150 trials without 
signalling these changes to the animal. The sum of reward probabilities for objects A and B 
was held constant so that only relative reward probability varied. 
 
Definition of object value 
We followed an established approach for modelling action value used in previous behavioral 
and neurophysiological experiments in macaques
2-5
. As the optimal strategy in our task 
involved tracking the changing values of objects, rather than actions, we formulated the 
model in terms of object choices rather than action choices. The approach involves fitting a 
logistic regression model to the animal’s trial-by-trial choice data to estimate coefficients for 
the recent history of received rewards and recently made choices. The resulting coefficients 
quantify the extent to which the animals based their choices on recently received rewards and 
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made choice for a given option. We used the following logistic regression model to determine 
the coefficients for reward history and choice history (Eq. 2):  
 
log (
𝑝𝐴(𝑖)
𝑝𝐵(𝑖)
) =  ∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑟(𝑅𝐴(𝑖 − 𝑗) − 𝑅𝐵(𝑖 − 𝑗)) + 
𝑁
𝑗=1
∑ 𝛽𝑗
𝑐(𝐶𝐴(𝑖 − 𝑗) − 𝐶𝐵(𝑖 − 𝑗)) + 𝛽0 
𝑁
𝑗=1
 
 
with 𝑝𝐴(𝑖)[or 𝑝𝐵(𝑖)] as the probability of choosing object A (or B) on the ith trial, 𝑅𝐴[or 𝑅𝐵] 
as reward delivery after choice of object A [or B] on the ith trial, 𝐶𝐴[or 𝐶𝐵] as choice of 
object A [or B] on the ith trial, N denoting the number of past trials included in the model (N 
= 10),  𝛽𝑗
𝑟 and 𝛽𝑗
𝑐as regression coefficients for the effect of past rewards and choices and 𝛽0 
as bias term. The regression model was estimated by fitting regressors to a binary choice 
indicator function using a binomial distribution with logit link function. The coefficients for 
reward and choice history from this analysis are plotted in Fig. 2B as reward and choice 
filters. Within each animal, we used half of the behavioral data set to estimate model 
coefficients and the remaining half of the data for testing the model. To test the model in an 
out-of-sample prediction, we used logistic regressions to fit each animal’s choices in a given 
testing session to the corresponding reward and choice histories multiplied with the filter 
weights obtained from independent data. For this model, we summed the weighted reward 
and choice histories for each object to obtain measures of object A value and object B value, 
which constituted our regressors for the out-of-sample prediction. Figure 2C shows the mean 
coefficients for these object values averaged over both animals and all remaining sessions 
(random effects analysis). The same object value measures were used as regressors for 
neuronal data. 
 
Neuronal data analysis 
We counted neuronal impulses in each neuron on correct trials relative to different task 
events with 500 ms time windows that were fixed across neurons: before fixation spot (Pre-
fix, starting 500 ms before fixation onset), early fixation (Fix, following fixation onset), late 
fixation (Fix2, starting 500 ms after fixation spot onset), pre-cue (Pre-cue, starting 500 ms 
before cue onset), cue (Cue, following cue onset), post-fixation (Post-fix, following fixation 
offset), before cue offset (Pre-cue off, starting 500 ms before cue offset), after cue offset 
(Post-cue off, following cue offset), pre-outcome (Pre-outc, starting 500 ms before reinforcer 
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delivery), outcome (Outc, starting at outcome delivery), late outcome (Outc2, starting 500 ms 
after outcome onset). 
We first identified task-related responses in individual neurons and then used multiple 
regression analysis to test for different forms of value-related activity while controlling for 
the most important behaviorally relevant covariates. We identified task-related responses by 
comparing activity to a control period (Pre-fix) using the Wilcoxon test (P < 0.005, 
Bonferroni-corrected for multiple comparisons). A neuron was included as task-related if its 
activity in at least one task period was significantly different to that in the control period. 
Because the Pre-fixation period served as control period we did not select for task-relatedness 
in this period and included all neurons with observed impulses in the analysis. We chose the 
pre-fixation period as control period because it was the earliest period at the start of a trial in 
which no sensory stimuli were presented. The additional use of a sliding-window regression 
approach for which no comparison with a control period was performed (see below) 
confirmed the results of the fixed window analysis that involved testing for task-relationship. 
The fixed-window analysis identified the following numbers of task-related responses in the 
different task periods: Pre-fix: 205, Fix: 84, Fix2: 93, Pre-cue: 96, Cue: 133, Post-fix: 119, 
Pre-cue off: 110, Post-cue off: 103, Pre-outc: 115, Outc: 103, Outc2: 61. 
We next used multiple regression analysis to assess relationships between neuronal 
activity and planning variables. The use of multiple regression was considered appropriate for 
the present data after testing assumptions of randomness of residuals, constancy of variance, 
and normality of error terms. Statistical significance of regression coefficients was 
determined using t-test with P < 0.05 as criterion, and was supported by the results of a 
bootstrap technique as described in the Results. Our analysis followed established approaches 
previously used to test for value coding in different brain structures
1,5
. All tests performed 
were two-sided. Each neuronal response was tested with the following main multiple 
regression model (Eq. 3):  
 
𝑦 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝐶ℎ𝑜𝑖𝑐𝑒 + 𝛽2𝐶𝑢𝑒𝑃𝑜𝑠𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽3𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 +  𝛽4𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐴 
+  𝛽5𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐵 +  𝜀  
 
with y as trial-by-trial neuronal impulse rate, ObjectChoice as current-trial object choice (0 
for A, 1 for B), CuePosition as current-trial spatial cue position (0 for object A on the left, 1 
for object A on the right), Action as current-trial action (0 for left, 1 for right), ObjectValueA 
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as current-trial value of object A, ObjectValueB as current-trial value of object B, 1 to 5 as 
corresponding regression coefficients, 0 as constant, ε as residual. Object value regressors 
were defined as described in the previous section. Coefficients for all regressors within a 
model were estimated simultaneously. Thus, a significant regressor indicated that a 
significant portion of the variation in neuronal impulse rate could be uniquely attributed to 
this variable. We followed standard procedures for assessing multicollinearity in multiple 
regression analysis. We confirmed that variance inflation factors were generally low (Mean = 
1.53 ± 0.17 s.e.m.; 99% of VIFs < 3; VIFs calculated separately within each neuronal testing 
session for regression model in Eq. 3), indicating that multicollinearity did not affect our 
statistical analysis. 
 For the regression analysis shown in Fig. 6D, we fit the following model to the 
neuronal data (Eq. 4): 
 
𝑦 =  𝛽0 +  𝛽1𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐴 +  𝛽2𝑂𝑏𝑗𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑉𝑎𝑙𝑢𝑒𝐵 +  𝜀  
 
A neuronal response was categorized as value-related if it showed a significant overall model 
fit (P < 0.05, F-test). We then projected each value-related response onto the value space 
given by the regression coefficients for object value A and object value B (Fig. 6D). 
Following a previous study44, we divided the value space into eight equally spaced segments 
of 45° which provided a categorization of neuronal responses based on their polar angle of 
coefficients in value space. Responses were classified as coding object value (‘absolute 
value’) if their coefficients fell in the segments pointing toward 0° or 180° (object value A) or 
toward 90° or 270° (object value B). Responses were categorized as coding value difference 
if their coefficients fell in the segments pointing toward 135° or 315° and as coding value 
sum if their coefficients fell in the segments pointing toward 45° or 225°. This method of 
classification has been called ‘axis-invariant’ as its results do not depend on the choice of axis 
for the regression model, i.e. whether the regression model includes separate independent 
variables for object values A and B or separate independent variables for the sum and 
differences between object values44.  
We also used a sliding window multiple regression analysis (using the regression 
model in Eq. 3) with a 200-ms window that we moved in steps of 25 ms across each trial. To 
determine whether neuronal activity was significantly related to a given variable we used a 
bootstrap approach based on shuffled data as follows. For each neuron, we performed the 
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sliding window regression 1,000 times on trial-shuffled data and determined a false positive 
rate by counting the number of consecutive windows in which a regression was significant 
with P<0.05. We found that less than five per cent of neurons with trial-shuffled data showed 
more than six consecutive significant analysis windows. In other words, we used the shuffled 
data to obtain the percentage of neurons with at least on case of six consecutively significant 
windows. Therefore, we counted a sliding window analysis as significant if a neuron showed 
a significant (P < 0.05) effect for more than six consecutive windows. 
  
Normalization of population activity 
We subtracted from the measured impulse rate in a given task period the mean impulse rate 
of the control period and divided by the standard deviation of the control period (z-score 
normalization). Next, we distinguished neurons that showed a positive relationship to object 
value and those with a negative relationship, based on the sign of the regression coefficient, 
and sign-corrected responses with a negative relationship. 
 
Normalization of regression coefficients 
Standardized regression coefficients were defined as xi(si/sy), xi being the raw slope 
coefficient for regressor i, and si and sy the standard deviations of independent variable i and 
the dependent variable, respectively. These coefficients were used for Fig. 3d, Fig. 4e,i, Fig. 
5b, Fig. 6e, Supplementary Fig. 2a,b and Supplementary Fig. 3c.  
 
Population decoding 
We used support vector machine (SVM) and nearest-neighbor (NN) classifiers to quantify the 
information contained in DLPFC population activity in defined task periods, following 
decoding analysis approaches from previous neurophysiological studies
61-63
. The SVM 
classifier was trained on a set of training data to find a linear hyperplane that provides the 
best separation between two patterns of neuronal population activity defined by a grouping 
variable (e.g. high vs. low object value). Decoding was typically not improved by non-linear 
(e.g. quadratic) kernels. The NN classifier was similarly trained on a set of test data and 
decoding was performed by assigning each trial to the group of its nearest neighbor in a space 
defined by the distribution of impulse rates for the different levels of the grouping variables 
using the Euclidean distance
62
. Both SVM and NN classification are biologically plausible in 
that a downstream neuron could perform similar classification by comparing the input on a 
given trial with a stored vector of synaptic weights. Both classifiers performed qualitatively 
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similar, although SVM decoding was typically more accurate. We therefore focus our main 
results on SVM decoding. 
We aggregated z-normalized trial-by-trial impulse rates of independently recorded 
DLPFC neurons from specific task periods into pseudo-populations. We used all recorded 
neurons that met inclusion criteria for a minimum trial number, without pre-selecting for 
value coding, except where explicitly stated. For each decoding analysis, we created two n by 
m matrices with n columns defined by the number of neurons and m rows by the number of 
trials. We defined two matrices, one for each group for which decoding was performed (e.g. 
high vs. low object value, left vs. right action etc.). Thus, each cell in a matrix contained the 
impulse rate from a single neuron on a single trial measured for a given group. Because 
neurons were not simultaneously recorded, we randomly matched up trials from different 
neurons for the same group and then repeated the decoding analysis with different random 
trial matching (within-group trial matching) 150 times for the SVM and 500 times for the 
NN. We found these numbers to produce very stable classification results. (We note that this 
approach likely provides a lower bound for decoding performance as it ignores potential 
contributions from cross-correlations between neurons; investigation of cross-correlations 
would require data from simultaneously recorded neurons.) We used a leave-one-out cross-
validation procedure whereby a classifier was trained to learn the mapping from impulse rates 
to groups on all trials except one; the remaining trial was then used for testing the classifier 
and the procedure repeated until all trials had been tested. An alternative approach of using 
80% trials as training data and testing on the remaining 20% produced highly similar 
results
61
. We only included neurons in the decoding analyses that had a minimum number of 
10 trials per group for which decoding was performed, and we confirmed that results were 
very similar when increasing this minimum number to 20 trials. 
The SVM decoding was implemented in Matlab (Version R2013b, Mathworks, 
Natick, MA) using the ‘svmtrain’ and ‘svmclassify’ functions with a linear kernel and the 
default sequential minimal optimization method for finding the separating hyperplane. 
Decoding could typically not be improved by using radial basis function or quadratic kernels. 
The NN decoding was performed in Matlab using custom-written code. We quantified 
decoding accuracy as the percentage of correctly classified trials, averaged over all decoding 
analyses for different random within-group trial matchings. To investigate how decoding 
accuracy depends on population size, we randomly selected a given number of neurons at 
each step and then determined the percentage correct. For each step (i.e. each possible 
population size) this procedure was repeated 10 times. We also performed decoding for 
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randomly shuffled data (shuffled group assignment without replacement) with 1,500 – 5,000 
iterations to test whether decoding on real data differed significantly from chance. Statistical 
significance (P < 0.0001) was determined by comparing vectors of percentage correct 
decoding accuracy between real data and randomly shuffled data using the rank sum test
62
. 
For all analyses, decoding was performed on neuronal responses taken from the same task 
period. We trained classifiers to distinguish high from low value terciles (decoding based on 
median split produced very similar results). Notably, even these discretized values fit 
significantly to choices (P = 2.4 × 10
-6
, logistic regression), suggesting they were 
behaviorally relevant. 
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Fig. 1. Foraging task and matching behavior. a. Object-based foraging task. b. 
Relationship between log-transformed choice and reward ratios across sessions. The base 
reward probability ratio was significantly related to the choice ratio (animal A: 11,040 trials 
from 139 sessions, t137 = 13.09, linear regression; data were similar for animal B: R
2
 = 0.740, 
P = 4.7 × 10
-20
; 5,306 trials from 65 sessions, t63=13.37) c. Behavior in one example session: 
choices tracked relative reward probability. Dark blue curve: instantaneous fraction (7-trial 
running average) of object A choices. Light blue curve: instantaneous fraction of rewards 
received from object A. Yellow curves: block-wise reward (light) and choice (dark) ratios. 
Colored boxes indicate block durations, numbers indicate reward ratios: object A to B. d. 
Filters used to generate subjective object values: influence of past rewards on current-trial 
choice. Filters represent logistic regression weights derived from independent behavioral data 
(animal A: 5520 trials, d.f. = 5,499; animal B: 2,653 trials, d.f. = 2,632). * P < 0.05. e. Model 
choices closely tracked the animal’s choices (same session as in a). Dark/light blue curve: 
running average of animal/model choices for object A. Vertical bars: animal choices for 
objects A (red) and B (green); long bars indicate rewarded trials. Black traces: subjective 
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object values derived from weighted and summed reward and choice histories. f. Out-of-
sample prediction of choices from values. Logistic regression weights for object A value (P = 
1.3 × 10
-22
, t-test) and object B value (P = 7.1 × 10
-20
) and cue position (non-significant; 
coefficients pooled over animals and sessions; 102 sessions, t-test, d.f. = 99). g. Decision 
function relating value difference to choice probability (data pooled over animals and 
sessions). h. Multiple regression of trial initiation times (key touch latencies) on value sum 
and covariates (12,358 trials, d.f. = 12,352). Only value sum and animal coefficients were 
significant (both P < 0.0001, t-test). i. Single linear regression of trial initiation time on value 
sum (plot constructed by binning trials according to value sum and then determining reaction 
time means; data pooled over animals and sessions). Error bars show s.e.m. 
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Fig. 2. A single DLPFC neuron encoding object value. a. Peri-event time histogram of 
impulse rates, aligned to cue onset, sorted into terciles of object value (derived from our 
behavioral model). Raster display: ticks indicate impulses, rows indicate trials; grey dots 
indicate event markers (labelled below graph; Off: cue offset). Pre-cue activity leading up to 
the current-trial choice in the cue period reflected the value of object A. Visual stimulation 
and eye position were constant in this period; thus, the activity pattern reflected an internal 
valuation process based on reward and choice history and was not due to sensory or motor 
variables. Yellow shaded period (500 ms before cue onset) was used for analysis. b. Linear 
regression of pre-cue impulse rate on the value of object A and object B (12 equally 
populated value bins from 133 trials; d.f. = 11). c. Independence of activity from object 
choice. Same data as in a, sorted by trial-specific object choice. d. Coefficients obtained from 
fitting a multiple linear regression model to pre-cue impulse rate. Only the value of object A 
explained a significant proportion of variance in impulse rate (t127 = -3.48, t-test). All 
coefficients were fit simultaneously. e. Plot of regression coefficient in value space using an 
axis-invariant classification that categorizes neurons as coding object value (value A or value 
B) or coding relative value (value difference, value sum) based on the polar angle in value 
space. Error bars show s.e.m. 
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Fig. 3. Characteristics of value coding in DLPFC neurons. a. Mean normalized activity 
for value responses in different trial periods (identified by multiple linear regression, P < 
0.05, calculated for each response), sorted into value terciles. Yellow shaded periods were 
used for analysis. N refers to number of responses b. Percentages of value responses (among 
task-related responses) in different trial periods. c. Recording locations in upper and lower 
principal sulcus banks. Numbers indicate anterior-posterior distance from inter-aural line. 
Inset: photomicrograph of a cresyl violet-stained coronal section of the frontal lobe in 
monkey A. The lesion in the principal sulcus marks a typical electrode track. d. Object-
specificity of value coding. Linear regression of population activity (273 value-coding 
responses taken across task periods) on object value for preferred and alternative object. Data 
points indicate means of 11 equally populated value bins ± s.e.m. e. Classification of value 
responses (across task periods) based on position of regression coefficients in value space. 
The figure shows the classification into object value coding or relative (sum/difference) value 
coding depending on the polar angle (θ) of coefficients in value space (colored areas), 
calculated as four-quadrant arc-tangent of the coefficients. Yellow data point: example 
neuron from Fig. 2. f. Proportion of value coding responses across task periods reflecting 
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object value (only value A or value B) and responses reflecting relative value (value 
sum/difference). Black/orange bars: results obtained from conventional multiple regression 
and axis-invariant method. * P < 0.05 (χ2-test). g. Distribution of regression coefficients (273 
value-coding responses; fixed-window analysis across all task periods) for object value and 
choice. Most value responses had non-significant choice coefficients (Kolmogorov-Smirnov 
test). 
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Fig. 4. Neuronal object values and matching behavior. a. Neuronal object values provide a 
suitable foundation for local choice probability and global matching behavior. Left: Average 
value-related activities for object A (red) and B (green) tracked local choice probability 
(bars), calculated for discrete 16 value bins (d.f. = 14). Right: Local choice probabilities, 
binned according to object value and aggregated over trial blocks, were related to 
experienced reward ratios, consistent with matching behavior. b. Neuronal sensitivity to 
object value is related to behavioral valuation accuracy. Unsigned neuronal regression 
coefficients for value coding plotted against behavioral ‘valuation accuracy’ (defined as 
session-specific correlation between estimated values and true reward probabilities). Stronger 
neuronal value coding predicted more accurate behavioral valuation. Valuation accuracy was 
also related to better choices (i.e. choosing the object with higher true reward probability, R = 
0.178, P = 0.0037, linear regression). c. Relationship between neuronal object values and 
performance. The strength of neuronal value coding dropped transiently when the animals 
would commit an error and subsequently increased on the next correct trial. Linear 
regressions of normalized population activity on object value, calculated across 273 value-
coding responses (18,117 trials), separately for pre-error, error and post-error trials. *: P < 
0.05, t-test for dependent samples. Data in all plots are taken across all task periods. 
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Fig. 5. Value construction and choice conversion in DLPFC neurons. a. A single DLPFC 
neuron with pre-cue activity reflecting last-trial choice before reflecting current-trial object 
value. Coefficients of partial determination (partial R
2
) obtained from multiple regression 
model applied with a sliding window. Asterisks indicate coding latencies, i.e. first time points 
at which activity was significantly related to a variable. b. Last-trial object choice and 
current-trial object value were coded with reference to the same object in individual neurons. 
Neuronal value coefficients for object A (upper panel, N = 49 coefficients, d.f. = 47) plotted 
against coefficients for choice history (defined as last-trial object A choice) for all responses 
with conjoint value and choice history encoding. A corresponding negative relationship was 
found for object B value coding (N = 63 coefficients, d.f. = 61).  c. A single DLPFC neuron 
with pre-cue activity reflecting object value before reflecting object choice. d. Comparison of 
coding latencies for value and choice. Cumulative record of coding latencies obtained from 
sliding window regression. Each curve was normalized to the total number of neurons 
significant for that variable (value: N = 119 neurons; choice: N = 74 neurons). e. A single 
DLPFC neuron with pre-cue activity reflecting transitions from last-trial history variables to 
current-trial object value, and from object value to upcoming object choice. f. Summary of 
neurons with significant coding of value, history (reward, choice, reward × choice) and 
choice and their conjunctions, obtained from sliding window regression. 
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Fig. 6. Population decoding of object value. a. Performance of a linear support vector 
machine classifier in decoding object choice, cue position, action, and object value across 
task periods. Performance was measured as cross-validated classification accuracy (% 
correct, mean ± s.e.m.) based on single-trial data from all DLPFC neurons that met inclusion 
criteria for decoding (N = 166 for binary variables choice, cue position and action; N = 157 
for object value terciles). The grey line in each plot indicates mean (± s.e.m) decoding 
performance from trial-shuffled data. Red asterisks indicate that decoding accuracy 
significantly exceeded shuffled decoding (rank-sum test). b. Object value decoding 
performance in the pre-cue period increased with the number of neurons. Data for each 
neuron number show means (± s.e.m) over 10 random combinations of different neurons. The 
classifier was trained to decode both object A and B value; thus, data from each neuron (N = 
157) were sampled twice. c. Object value decoding in individual neurons (in pre-cue period) 
was related to individual neuron’s value sensitivity (object value linear regression slope). d. 
Object value decoding in different sets of neurons (in pre-cue period), depending on 
individual neuron’s significance of object value regression. Signif: neurons with individually 
significant object A value regression coefficients (based on randomly chosen subsets of N = 
20); All: neurons that met inclusion criteria for decoding (N = 157); Rand: randomly selected 
neurons irrespective of object value significance (N = 20); Single: single-neuron decoding 
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decoding for all neurons that met inclusion criteria (N = 157); N-signif: randomly selected 
neurons excluding those with significant object value coefficients (N = 20). e. Relationship 
between decoding performance and single-neuron value sensitivities, tested over randomly 
selected neuron subsets (8,000 samples randomly drawn without replacement, N = 20 per 
sample). Decoding depended on average single-neuron sensitivity (mean unsigned value 
regression coefficient, averaged over all 20 neurons in each sample). 
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Fig. 7. Population decoding of decision variables derived from object value. a. 
Performance (% correct, mean ± s.e.m.) of a linear support vector machine classifier in 
decoding value sum, signed value difference and absolute (unsigned) value difference in 
different task periods (N = 157 neurons). b. Comparison of decoding performance for object 
value (blue data) and value sum (red data). The grey horizontal line indicates chance level. 
Red asterisks indicate significantly higher accuracy for value sum than object value (rank-
sum test); blue asterisks indicate significantly higher accuracy for object value than value 
sum. c. Relationship between decoding accuracy in individual neurons and neurons’ 
standardized object value regression coefficients, shown separately for object value A (upper 
panels, pre-cue period) and value sum (lower panels, fixation period). d. Decoding 
performance as a function of neuron number for object value and value sum in fixation period 
(top) and pre-cue period (bottom). Asterisks indicate significant differences in decoding 
accuracy for object value and value sum. 
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Fig. 8. Summary of present findings. a. DLPFC contains subpopulations of neurons that are 
non-selective for object value but code value precursor variables, including object reward and 
choice history. We suggest that convergence of these signals onto postsynaptic DLPFC 
neurons generates the explicit value signals for specific choice objects as observed in single 
DLPFC neurons in the present study. b. Hypothesized relations between DLPFC object value 
neurons and population readout, based on the current data. Individual object value neurons 
learn and update values of specific objects (A, B), signal object-specific values, and convert 
value to choice signals, as suggested by our single-neuron analyses. Curved arrows indicate a 
hypothesized competition process via mutual inhibition
7-9
 (likely involving pools of 
inhibitory interneurons
7-9
 not shown). Convergence of object value signals onto different 
downstream neurons could enable readout of value sum (‘Motivation’), signed value 
difference (‘Decision-making’) and unsigned value difference (‘Confidence’), as suggested 
by our population decoding analyses; these quantities are conceptually linked with specific 
motivational and decision processes.  
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